



DECLASSIFIED
A/ISS/IPS, Department of State
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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 AF-10 ARA-11 EA-11 EUR-20 NEA-10 RSC-01
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R 172308Z JAN 73
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6226

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 USUN 140

SURJ: THE US AND THE UN

1. IN ASSESSING 27TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND 1972 PERFORMANCE OF UNITED NATIONS AS WHOLE, BOTH INTERNAL USG OBSERVERS AND MANY PRESS CRITICS HAVE TENDED TO REGARD THE PERIOD AS ONE OF DECLINE OF PRESTIGE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF UN AND INCREASING ISOLATION FOR THE UNITED STATES. THERE IS BASIS FOR THIS ASSESSMENT, BUT THERE CAN ALSO BE A VERY DIFFERENT KIND OF ASSESSMENT. I WOULD NOT LIKE TO LEAVE MY ASSIGNMENT TO THE UN WITHOUT PUTTING ON RECORD SOME OF THESE OTHER ASPECTS OF THE US POSITION IN THE UN.

2. FRIENDS AND ACQUAINTANCES IN OTHER DELEGATIONS HAVE IN NUMBER OF INSTANCES VOLUNTEERED TO USUN THAT "THIS HAS BEEN PRETTY GOOD YEAR FOR US, HASN'T IT?" THEY REFER TO FACT THAT WE WON DIFFICULT VICTORIES ON 25 PERCENT AND KOREAN INSCRIPTION ISSUES, THAT WE MADE PROGRESS ON LOS, ENVIRONMENT, AND OTHER ITEMS, AND THAT WE CAME OFF RELATIVELY WELL (AS THEY SEE IT) THEY RECOGNIZE THAT WE WERE SERIOUSLY DISAPPOINTED BY LACK OF PROGRESS IN DIFFICULT AREAS SUCH AS MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICAN QUESTIONS, ON TERRORISM, BUT DO NOT SEE US AS HAVING BEEN HUMILIATED. WHILE WE HAVE TENDED TO JUDGE OUR EFFECTIVENESS BY QUALITY OF LANGUAGE OF RESOLUTIONS PASSED BY UN, MANY UN MEMBERS FOCUS ON OUR "SUCCESS" IN DAMAGE LIMITATION AND IN EMERGING FROM BRUISING DEBATE WITH OUR PRESTIGE AND STORE OF GOODWILL UNDAUNTED OR EVEN IMPROVED. ON SUCH BASES, WE DID INDEED COME OUT PRETTY WELL IN 1972.

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3. OBSERVERS WHO SEE OUR SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN TERMS OF US-SOVIET COMPETITION ARE PARTICULARLY LIKELY TO CONCLUDE THAT THIS WAS GOOD YEAR FOR US. OUR VICTORIES ON KOREAN INSCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT ISSUES WERE ACHIEVED IN DIRECT CONFRONTATION WITH SOVIETS. ADDITIONALLY, SOVIETS GOT LITTLE SATISFACTION FROM THEIR NEW RHETORICAL ISSUES (NON-USE OF FORCE, DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITES), AND MADE LITTLE HEADWAY ON THEIR PERENNIALS (WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, STRENGTHENING INT'S SECURITY). WHILE WE BELIEVE THAT ON THEIR MERITS NONE OF THESE DESERVED GREATER ATTENTION, DESPITE THEIR "MOTHERHOOD" LABELS, WE TAKE GOOD DEAL OF SATISFACTION FROM OUR SUCCESSFUL DAMAGE LIMITATION.

4. PERHAPS MORE TRULY SIGNIFICANT IS THAT IN UN PERSPECTIVE US-SOVIET RIVALRY, WHILE CONTINUING, IS NO LONGER SEEN BY WORLD COMMUNITY AS SINGLE DOMINATING CHARACTERISTIC OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE. SHADOW CAST BY THIS RIVALRY HAS SHORTENED IN RELATIVE TERMS WHEN SET AGAINST EMERGENCE OF PRC AND A NEW SELF-AWARENESS OF SMALLER, POORER MEMBERS OF WORLD COMMUNITY. PERHAPS ONE OF UTILITIES OF UN IS THAT IT OBLIGES OTHERWISE SELF-CENTERED NATIONS OF ALL SHAPES AND SIZES TO LOOK HOWEVER MYOPICALLY AT WHOLE WORLD COMMUNITY. WE MUST IN JUDGING UN FOR OURSELVES REMAIN AWARE THAT UN CANNOT BE MUCH BETTER THAN SUM OF ITS PARTS AND THAT IF UN DID NOT EXIST, WE SHOULD STILL HAVE TO FACE SAME RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL ATTITUDES.

5. IT HAS BEEN OBSERVED THAT US WAS THIS YEAR FREQUENTLY IN ISOLATION FROM GENERAL CONSENSUS. THIS CAN BE DOCUMENTED ON POLITICAL ISSUES, BUT I BELIEVE STATEMENT COULD CONTRIBUTE TO MISUNDERSTANDING OF OUR TOTAL POSITION. WE MUST MAKE DISTINCTION BETWEEN TACTICAL ISOLATION, AS WHEN WE CHOOSE TO BE ONLY ABSTAINER ON ESTABLISHING WDC STUDY COMMITTEE OR LONG "NAY" IN COMMITTEE ON KENYA'S BID FOR ENVIRONMENT SECRETARIAT, AND ISOLATION ON SUBSTANCE. ON BOTH WDC AND UNCHC, WE OPTED FOR UNIQUE VOTING POSITION BUT WERE BY NO MEANS ALONE IN OUR SUBSTANTIVE VIEWS. ON BOTH ISSUES A SIGNIFICANT MINORITY OF PRESITIGIOUS UN MEMBERS SHARED OUR RESERVATIONS AND NEGATIVE VIEWS BUT ELECTED TO AVOID ISOLATED VOTING POSTURE.

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6. ON BROAD ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE, THERE ARE VERY FEW AREAS IN WHICH WE TEND TO BE GENUINELY ISOLATED. AS ISRAEL BECOMES INCREASINGLY ISOLATED, US AS ISRAEL'S FOREMOST CHAMPION TENDS TO BE ISOLATED IN TURN. EVEN IN THIS CASE IT IS THOUGHT THAT US HAS UNIQUE POTENTIAL FOR CATALYZING NEGOTIATIONS, AND SOME ARABS WHO THINK OUR BEHAVIOUR NOW PRO-ISRAELI HAVE CONFIDENCE IN OUR FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS. WE HAVE BEEN PROTECTED FROM ATTACKS ON OUR VIETNAM POSITION BY FACT OTHER SIDE DOES NOT WANT ISSUE IN UN. ON AFRICAN ISSUES WE SOMETIMES APPEAR IN VOTING RECORDS TO BE RELATIVELY ISOLATED, BUT AGAIN IN THIS INSTANCE THE ISOLATION IS MORE TACTICAL THAN SUBSTANTIVE AND THE BASIC SINCERITY OF OUR BELIEF IN SELF-DETERMINATION AND OUR OPPOSITION TO RACISM IS GENERALLY RESPECTED.

7. OUR RELATIVE TACTICAL ISOLATION IN VOTING RECORDS HAS SOMETIMES BEEN RESULT OF "BLOC VOTING". WHILE BLOC VOTING IS NOT NECESSARILY BAD AND IN SOME FORM CHARACTERIZES SOME OF WORLD'S MOST EFFECTIVE PARLIAMENTS, BLOC VOTING IN UN HAS OFTEN LOWERED STANDARDS AND DISSERVED IMMEDIATE US INTERESTS. REGIONAL LOYALTY FREQUENTLY LEADS AFRICANS, LATIN AMERICANS AND ASIANS TO VOTE MORE OR LESS AS BLOCS DESPITE CONFLICTING INTERESTS WITHIN GROUPS. EVEN THE WEO GROUP VOTES AS BLOC ON OCCASION. TENDENCY TO PERFORM AS BLOC TENDS TO BE GREATEST ON ISSUES INVOLVING REGIONAL PRIDE--E.G., LOCATION OF A UN HEADQUARTERS IN AFRICA AND CONVENING OF SECURITY COUNCIL IN A LATIN AMERICAN CAPITAL. WHEN UNITY IS SOUGHT ON BASIS THIS KIND OF INHERENTLY EMOTIONAL APPEAL TO GROUP LOYALTY, IT IS NOT UNNATURAL THAT VOICE OF EMOTION -- SOMETIMES HIGHLY OFFENSIVE--TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER VOICE OF REALISTIC RATIONAL PRAGMATISM.

8. THERE MAY BE AN INCIPIENT COUNTER-TREND LIMITING THIS TENDENCY. IN SOME INSTANCES REGIONAL GROUPS HAVE PERCEIVED

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INFO DCT-01 ADP-00 CIAE-00 CODE-00 PM-08 H-02 INR-09 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-14 USIA-12 AF-10
ARA-11 EA-11 EUR-20 NEA-10 RSE-01 /140 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6227

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ADVANTAGE IN SUFFICIENTLY MODERATING THEIR POSITIONS TO
PILE UP IMPRESSIVE MAJORITIES AS AGAINST ADVANTAGE OF MORE
EXTREME RESOLUTIONS PASSED BY BARE MAJORITIES. WHILE
SPONSORS OF RESOLUTIONS UNACCEPTABLE TO US ARE NO LONGER
PREDISPOSED TO MODIFY THEM JUST TO GET US VOTE, HOWEVER,
ON KEY ISSUES, WHERE US ACTION OR MONEY IS REQUIRED,
NECESSITY OF US SUPPORT, OR AT LEAST NON-OPPOSITION, IS
RECOGNIZED AND DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ARE OFTEN MODIFIED.
ACCORDINGLY, TENDENCY TOWARD BLOC VOTING CAN USUALLY BE
COUNTERED SUCCESSFULLY IF TIMELY AND DETERMINED EFFORT CAN
BE MADE TO SHOW INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF REGIONAL GROUPS THAT
THEIR HARD INTERESTS, PARTICULARLY THEIR IMMEDIATE FINANCIAL
INTERESTS, ARE AT STAKE. FOR EXAMPLE, ON 25 PERCENT ASSESSMENT
ISSUE, OR PROPOSAL WAS NOT VERY ATTRACTIVE TO MANY UN
MEMBERS. WE WERE ABLE NONETHELESS NOT ONLY TO PREVENT
BLOC OPPOSITION BUT ALSO TO OBTAIN STRONG MAJORITY SUPPORT
IN AFRICAN GROUP BY EMPHASIZING RELEVANCE OF ISSUE TO
CONTINUED STRONG US SUPPORT OF UNDP AND OTHER VOLUNTARY
AGENCIES.

9. FACT THAT SMALLER AND POORER COUNTRIES TEND TO BE
RELATIVELY PRAGMATIC IN VIEWING SHORT-RANGE ECONOMIC
INTERESTS AGAINST BACKGROUND OF US STRENGTH IN ECONOMIC
RESOURCES AND OF OUR INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENT MAY BE
IMPORTANT REASON WHY US PRESTIGE REMAINS RELATIVELY HIGH
AMONG THOSE DELEGATIONS REPRESENTING COUNTRIES WHOSE
PRIMARY MOTIVATION IN UN GAME IS DESIRE TO RECEIVE

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DEVELOPMENT BENEFITS.

10. AMONG TRIALS WE STILL FACE IN UN IS FACTOR THAT RELATES TO BUT GOES BEYOND BLOC VOTING PHENOMENON. THIS FACTOR IS GROWING COHESION OF MAJORITY OF POORER, WEAKER, SMALLER NATIONS IN UN WHO ARE AWARE THAT RICH, LARGE, POWERFUL NATIONS ARE IN MINORITY AND CAN BE OUT-VOTED. IN SHORT-RUN AT LEAST, THIS TREND IMPLIES DIFFICULTIES. IN MORE GENERAL WAY WE CAN OBSERVE THAT HAVE-NOT NATIONS, ARE FREQUENTLY TEMPTED TO SEEK SHORT-RUN ADVANTAGE, INCLUDING PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE, AT EXPENSE OF WHAT WE REGARD AS PRINCIPLE. "HAVE" NATIONS ARE BY NO MEANS IMMUNE FROM THIS SORT OF TEMPTATION. MOST OF FOUNDING FATHERS OF UN CONSIDERED, OR PRETENDED TO CONSIDER, SANCTITY OF PROPERTY, INVIOABILITY OF CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RULE OF LAW TO BE OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE, BUT POORER COUNTRIES NOW DO NOT FIND THESE VALUES SO IMPORTANT. IT MAY BE SOME TIME BEFORE THEY DO SO. MEANWHILE, THIRD WORLD TENDENCIES IN THIS DIRECTION HAVE BEGUN TO CREAT CERTAIN MUTUALITY OF INTEREST AMONG "HAVES" OF VARYING IDEOLOGY THAT DID NOT PREVIOUSLY EXIST.

11. IN SUM, AS I LOOK BACK OVER MY EXPERIENCE AT UN OVER PAST TWO YEARS, I AM NOT TEMPTED TO ENGAGE IN HAND-WRINGING. I AM CRITICAL, HOPEFULLY CONSTRUCTIVELY SO, OF ASPECTS OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATIONS, AND I BELIEVE THAT IN BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES WE ARE GOING TO FACE RECURRENT FRUSTRATIONS. HOWEVER, NOW THAT I KNOW IT AT FIRST HAND, I BELIEVE IN THE INSTITUTION MORE STRONGLY THAN WHEN I CAME TO NEW YORK. THE UN SYSTEM HAS ALREADY MADE AND IS MAKING SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTIONS TO WELFARE OF OUR COUNTRY AND OF ALL MANKIND, PARTICULARLY ON THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SIDE. THERE IS GENERAL RECOGNITION THAT IN THESE AREAS EFFECTIVENESS OF UN ACTIVITIES NEEDS IMPROVING, AND I BELIEVE THIS PROCESS IS ALREADY UNDER WAY. IN MY VIEW, LIMITATIONS TO SUCCESS ON POLITICAL SIDE ARE OFTEN INHERENT IN ASSOCIATION OF SOVEREIGN STATES AND REFLECT LESS STRONGLY ON VALIDITY OF UN STRUCTURE THAN ON SOUNDNESS AND WISDOM OF GOVERNMENTS THAT ARE ITS CONSTITUENTS. THE UN IS SLOWLY BECOMING MORE LIKE A PARLIAMENT, A POLITICAL RATHER THAN A DIPLOMATIC INSTITUTION. I HAVE FOUND IT EXCITING AND CHALLENGING TO REPRESENT US IN THIS POLITICAL ARENA AND HAVE CONFIDENCE

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THAT WE CAN ACHIEVE OUR FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES AT UN IF WE
MAKE THE EFFORT--AND THAT IT IS WORTH THE EFFORT. XGDS.
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